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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Gabriel Torres was convicted in one case after a jury trial of being an inmate in 
possession of a dangerous weapon. In a separate case, Mr. Torres pied guilty to one 
count of aggravated assault. He received an aggregate unified sentence of five years, 
with two and one-half years fixed. On appeal, he contends that the district court 
violated his right to due process by incorrectly instructing the jury on the elements of 
possession of a dangerous weapon, and further contends that his aggregate sentence 
represents an abuse of the district court's discretion, as it is excessive given any view of 
the facts. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Supreme Court Docket No. 40198 (Canyon County district court case number 
2011-20199 (hereinafter, the dangerous weapon case) and Supreme Court Docket No. 
40199 (Canyon County district court case number 2012-6406 (hereinafter, the 
aggravated assault case) have been consolidated for appellate purposes. (R., p.291.) 
In the dangerous weapon case, on the afternoon of May 10, 2011, during a 
routine search of Mr. Torres' cell in county jail, Deputy Daniel Combs located three extra 
rolls of toilet paper, one regular hard cased pen and two inmate pens wrapped with 
paper. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.2.) Also found inside an 
envelope containing legal paperwork was the handle of a plastic spark. (PSI, p.2.) 
When Mr. Torres returned to his cell and was questioned, he said that he had found the 
broken spark handle. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Torres was charged by indictment with 
possession of a dangerous weapon by an inmate. (R., pp.8-9.) 
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At trial, Deputy Combs testified that on May 10, 2011, he was conducting a 
routine search of Mr. Torres' cell. (Trial Tr., p.153, L.23 - p.154, L.1.) He was 
searching for items of contraband, "anything extra, anything that the jail does not issue 
to that inmate." (Trial Tr., p.139, L.11 - p.141, L.2.) In Mr. Torres' cell, Deputy Combs 
found extra toilet paper, a hard case pen, and a spark handle. (Trial Tr., p.141, Ls.4-5.) 
Deputy Combs concluded that it appeared that Mr. Torres was hoarding items. (Trial 
Tr., p.150, Ls.20-22.) Deputy Combs described the item at issue as being a spark, with 
the spark portion cut off and the remaining handle as having been "sharpened to a 
point." (Trial Tr., p.144, Ls.7-11.) A spark was issued to each inmate during meal time 
and was then picked up by the deputy who took the meal tray from the inmate. (Trial 
Tr., p.146, Ls.10-13.) Deputy Combs also testified that the point on the sharpened 
spark handle was not any sharper than what would be found on the tine of the intact 
spark. (Trial Tr., p.149, Ls.19-25.) Deputy Combs testified that, based on his training 
and experience, the broken spark handle was a "dangerous weapon." (Trial Tr., p.145, 
Ls.20-23.) 
At the time of the incident, inmates received a spark with their meals, but then 
they had to return the item to be washed. (Trial Tr., p.150, L.23-p.151, L.3.) Deputy 
Combs testified that the sparks were collected after the meal so that they could be 
washed and reused, not for security reasons. (Trial Tr., p.151, Ls.7-19.) After the 
incident, the jail commissary began selling inmates sparks for $0.33. (Trial Tr., p.151, 
Ls.20-24.) The sparks being sold were of a thinner, softer material than the spark at 
issue. (Trial Tr., p.151, Ls.24-25.) Items purchased from the commissary could be kept 
in an inmate's cell. (Trial Tr., p.153, Ls.3-6.) Further, at the time of the incident, the jail 
sold items through its commissary that needed to be stirred-items such as tea and 
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cappuccino-but did not sell any utensils which could be used to stir such items. (Trial 
Tr., p.152, L.12- p.153, L.2.) 
The jury found Mr. Torres guilty of possession of a dangerous weapon by an 
inmate. (R., p.155.) 
In the aggravated assault case, a fight amongst six inmates occurred. (5/22/12 
Tr., p.4, Ls.18-19.) Mr. Torres was involved in the fight, although he was not the person 
who threw the first punch. (6/27/12 Tr., p.126, Ls.3-4.) The fight was brief and did not 
involve any weapons. (6/27/12 Tr., p.126, Ls.10-13.) A superceding indictment was 
filed charging Mr. Torres and five other individuals with rioting. (R., pp.209-210.) A part 
II of the superseding indictment added a gang enhancement. (R., pp.211-212.) 
As part of a plea agreement, Mr. Torres pied guilty to aggravated assault (as 
charged by an amended indictment) and, in exchange, the State agreed to recommend 
a concurrent sentence with the sentence imposed in the dangerous weapon case. 
(6/26/12 Tr., p.61, Ls.5-19, 6/27/12 Tr., p.73, Ls.10-16; R., pp.234-239.) At sentencing, 
the State recommended a sentence of three years fixed, followed by two years 
indeterminate on each charge, to be run concurrently. (6/27/12 Tr., p.120, Ls.1-9.) The 
defense asked that the district court sentence Mr. Torres to serve five years unified, with 
one year fixed on each charge, but either place Mr. Torres on probation or retain 
jurisdiction over him. (6/27/12 Tr., p.131, Ls.3-22.) The district court imposed upon 
Mr. Torres a five year sentence, with one and one-half years fixed, on the possession of 
a dangerous weapon charge, and on the aggravated assault charge, the district court 
sentenced Mr. Torres to a unified sentence of five years, with two and one-half years 
fixed, to be served concurrently. (6/27/12 Tr., p.143, L.19 - p.144, L.7, p.149, L.6; 
R, pp.176-177, 275-276.) 
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Mr. Torres then filed timely I.C.R. 35 Motion seeking a reduction of his sentences 
(hereinafter, Rule 35). (R., pp.192-193, 292-293.) The district court denied Mr. Torres's 
Rule 35 motion without a hearing. (Order Denying Motion for Reduction of Sentence 
Pursuant to I.C.R. 35, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on August 29, 2013.) 
Mr. Torres appeals from the judgments of conviction. 1 (R., pp.178-180, 188-191, 278-
280, 286-289.) 
1 On appeal, Mr. Torres does not challenge the denial of his Rule 35 motion. The 
district court found that there was no new or additional information filed in support of the 
Rule 35 motion. (Order Denying Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 
35, p.3, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on August 29, 2013.) The Idaho 
Supreme Court has held that "[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must 
show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information 
subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion. State v. 
Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). "An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion 
cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the presentation 
of new information. Id. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err by incorrectly instructing the jury on the elements of 
possession of a dangerous weapon? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an aggregate sentence 
of five years, with two and one-half years fixed, upon Mr. Torres following his 
plea of guilty to one count of aggravated assault and his conviction for one count 
of possession of a dangerous weapon? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred By Failing To Instruct The Jury On The Elements Of 
Possession Of A Dangerous Weapon 
A. Introduction 
The jury was incorrectly instructed on the elements of possession of a dangerous 
weapon - the jury was instructed that the State must prove, inter alia, that "the 
defendant, Gabriel Torres, while an inmate of the Canyon County Jail did possess a 
dangerous weapon, to-wit: a sharpened plastic eating utensi/."2 (R., p.146 (emphasis 
added).) Because the jury was informed that a sharpened plastic eating utensil was a 
dangerous weapon, the italicized language removed any requirement that the State 
prove that the object found was in fact a dangerous weapon, an element of the crime, 
thereby violating Mr. Torres' right to due process. 
2 Jury Instruction No. 12 provided: 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Possession of a 
Dangerous Weapon by an Inmate, the state must prove each of the 
following: 
1. On or about May 10, 2011 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. the defendant Gabriel Torres 
4. while an inmate 
5. of a [sic] the Canyon County Jail 
6. did possess 
7. a dangerous weapon, to-wit: a sharpened plastic eating utensil. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant guilty. 
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B. The District Court Erred By Incorrectly Instructing The Jury On The Elements Of 
Possession Of A Dangerous Weapon 
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Torres acknowledges that no objection was made to 
this jury instruction. Therefore, the claim raised is one of fundamental error. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has set forth the standard of appellate review of unobjected-to error. 
See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). Pursuant to Perry, a defendant must 
demonstrate that 1) one or more of his unwaived constitutional rights were violated; 2) 
there was a clear and obvious error without the need for additional information not 
contained in the appellate record; and 3) the error affected the defendant's substantial 
rights, meaning that there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome 
of the trial proceedings. Id. at 226. Mr. Torres meets all the prongs of this test. 
First, the alleged error is a violation of Mr. Torres' right to due process. 
Mr. Torres was charged with possession of a dangerous weapon.3 (R., pp.8-9.) 
However, the elements instruction told the jury that a sharpened plastic eating utensil 
was a dangerous weapon. (R., p.146.) The jury was instructed to determine whether 
Mr. Torres possessed "a dangerous weapon, to-wit a sharpened plastic eating utensil." 
The term "to-wit" is defined as "that is to say" or "namely." (Black's Law Dictionary (9th 
ed. 2009).) Thus the jury was instructed that a sharpened plastic eating utensil was a 
dangerous weapon. The instruction removed the State's burden to prove that a 
sharpened plastic eating utensil was a dangerous weapon. Thus, giving this instruction 
violated Mr. Torres's right to due process. 
3 In 2011, Idaho Code Section 18-2511 provided: 
Any inmate of a penal institution or jail who shall manufacture, deliver or 
possess a controlled substance or a dangerous weapon is guilty of a 
felony. 
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The instruction thus removed an element of the crime which the State was 
required to prove. "A trial court has the duty to properly instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the case before it." Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Gas. Ins. Co., 149 
Idaho 299, 313 (2010). "If a jury instruction lightens the prosecution's burden of proof 
by creating conclusive presumptions of guilt as to an element of an offense and requires 
the accused to come forward with evidence to rebut that presumption, it is a violation of 
due process." State v. Randles, 117 Idaho 344,348 (1990) overruled on other grounds 
by State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657 (2000); Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 
(1952); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). In Sandstrom, the United States 
Supreme Court found that, "a conclusive presumption . . . would 'conflict with the 
overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which 
extends to every element of the crime,' and would 'invade [the] factfinding function' 
which in a criminal case the law assigns solely to the jury." Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 
U.S. 510, 523 (1979) (reversing defendant's conviction, finding that a reasonable juror 
could believe the instruction either created a conclusive presumption regarding intent, or 
that it placed a burden on the accused to prove lack of intent and a reasonable juror 
could easily have viewed such an instruction as mandatory). 
A conclusive instruction violates the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that 
the State prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
instruction is unconstitutional. See id. In State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749 (2007), 
the Idaho Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the jury 
instructions constituted non-harmless fundamental error where the instructions omitted 
one of the elements of the offense. 144 Idaho at 7 49-750. The Court found that it 
"cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the 
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same conclusion had it faced all of the statutory elements." 144 Idaho at 749. The 
Anderson Court stated: 
The United States Supreme Court has held that in criminal trials "the State 
must prove every element of the offense, and a jury instruction violates 
due process if it fails to give effect to that requirement." 
State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho at 749 (internal citation omitted). 
In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the United States Supreme Court stated: 
"Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt 
standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against 
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which he is charged." Id. at 364, (emphasis added). Further, 
the Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized that "[a] statutory presumption that is 
mandatory, i.e., that is conclusive proof of an element of the crime or that requires the 
accused to present rebuttal evidence thereby shifting the burden of proof, is 
unconstitutional." State v. Hebner, 108 Idaho 196, 200 (Ct. App. 1985). 
Here, the jurors could reasonably have concluded that they were directed to find 
Mr. Torres guilty of possession of a dangerous weapon if they found that he possessed 
a sharpened plastic eating utensil. Such an interpretation would have deprived 
Mr. Torres of his right to the due process of law; thus, the instruction in this case was 
unconstitutional. Thus, the error implicates one of Mr. T orres's unwaived constitutional 
rights. 
Second, the error is clear and obvious from the record. The law is clear that "the 
Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 
charged." The jury instruction is in the record, so there is no need for additional 
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information outside the record. Further, there is no evidence that the failure to object to 
the instruction was a strategic decision, as Mr. Torres gained absolutely no strategic 
advantage by giving the jury an opportunity to convict him for possessing a broken 
eating utensil without requiring it to find that the object was, in fact, a dangerous 
weapon. Further, trial counsel strenuously argued in his closing remarks to the jury that 
the eating utensil was NOT a dangerous weapon. (Trial Tr., p.173, L.3 - p.175, L.25.) 
Third, there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings. While the jury heard evidence that Deputy Combs believed the object to 
be a dangerous weapon (Trial Tr., p.145, Ls.20-23), the jury also heard evidence that 
sparks were later being sold to inmates, and that the sparks could be kept in their cells.4 
(Trial Tr., p.151, Ls.20-24.) Further, Deputy Combs also testified that the point on the 
sharpened spark handle was not any sharper than what would be found on the tine of 
the intact spark. (Trial Tr., p.149, Ls.19-25.) However, because of the erroneous jury 
instruction, the jury was left with the impression that it could convict Mr. Torres if it found 
that he was in possession of a sharpened plastic eating utensil. 
It was apparent from the jury instruction that the jury could convict Mr. Torres if it 
found that he possessed a sharpened plastic eating utensil. This instruction is not only 
different from the element of the statute under which Mr. Torres was originally charged, 
but it removed the burden on the State to prove that the sharpened plastic eating utensil 
was a dangerous weapon. The instruction therefore required the jury to find Mr. Torres 
guilty if it found that he possessed the broken eating utensil. 
4 At the time of the incident, inmates could use received a spark with their meal, but 
then they had to return the item to be washed. (Trial Tr., p.150, L.23 - p.151, L.3.) 
Deputy Combs testified that the sparks were collected after the meal so that they could 
be washed and reused, not for security reasons. (Trial Tr., p.151, Ls.7-19.) 
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Because the giving of this instruction violated Mr. Torres' right to due process, 
and because he meets all three prongs of Idaho's fundamental error test, Mr. Torres' 
conviction must be vacated. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Aggregate Sentence Of 
Five Years, With Two And One-Half Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Torres Following His 
Convictions For One Count Of Possession Of A Dangerous Weapon And One Count Of 
Aggravated Assault 
Mr. Torres asserts that, given any view of the facts, his aggregate sentence of 
five years, with two and one-half years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant 
contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the 
appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to 
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public 
interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Torres does not allege that 
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, Mr. Torres must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or 
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
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In light of Mr. Torres' rehabilitative potential, the district court abused its 
discretion in sentencing Mr. Torres to incarceration and by not retaining jurisdiction over 
him. The district court failed to consider the fact that these were Mr. Torres' first felony 
convictions, and that, with programming, Mr. Torres could likely be successful in the 
community. (PSI, p.12.) 
Mr. Torres has a good work history. He was employed at Rocky Point 
Construction for five years before that business closed. (PSI, p.10.) He has had fairly 
regular employment since that time and was even a supervisor at his most recent job at 
Ida Cold Packaging. (PSI, p.13.) Idaho recognizes that good employment history 
should be considered a mitigating factor. See State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982); 
see also State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). 
Another consideration that should have received the attention of the district court 
is the fact that Mr. Torres has strong support from his family members. See State v. 
Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who had the 
support of his family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts). Mr. Torres is close to 
both of his parents and his brother and they are very supportive of him. (PSI, p.8.) 
Mr. Torres also has three young children, ages four, five and eight, and the youngest 
two live with Mr. Torres and his mother. (PSI, p.8.) Mr. Torres shares custody of his 
eldest child with the child's mother. (PSI, p.9.) Mr. Torres reported that his children are 
what are important to him in life.5 (PSI, p.12.) Mr. Torres wants to take care of his 
children and be in their lives. (PSI, p.12.) He is distressed that he is incarcerated and 
is unable to be there for his children. (PSI, p.12.) 
5 Mr. Torres even stopped drinking alcohol because he wanted to "be a better dad." 
(PSI, p.11.) 
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The facts of this case are somewhat similar to those in State v. Shideler, 103 
Idaho 593 (1982), a case in which the defendant was convicted of robbing a bank using 
a shotgun, after which, as he was making his getaway, he fired two shotgun blasts in 
the direction of a pursing pickup truck being driven by the husband of one of the bank 
employees. Id. at 594. In Shideler, the court modified the sentence from twenty years 
to twelve years. Id. at 593. The court found it significant that this was Mr. Shideler's 
first felony and "the defendant has accepted responsibility for his acts, and that his 
family and employer have shown considerable interest in his future." Id. at 595. Here, 
as in Mr. Shideler's case, these were Mr. Torres' first felony convictions. (3/9/12 
Tr., p.54, Ls.2-3; PSI, pp.2-6.) Like Mr. Shideler, Mr. Torres expressed regret for what 
he did, especially the effect his actions had upon his family. (PSI, p.12.) Like 
Mr. Shideler, Mr. Torres would like to be a productive citizen in the future.6 (PSI, p.17.) 
Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that the first offender 
should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal." State v. 
Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673 (1998) (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227 (1971)); see also 
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). The defendant in Hoskins pied guilty to two 
counts of drawing a check without funds. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673. In Nice, the 
defendant pied guilty to the charge of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor. Nice, 
103 Idaho at 90. In both Hoskins and Nice, the court considered, among other 
important factors, that the defendants had no prior felony convictions. Hoskins, 131 
6 Mr. Torres has only an eighth grade education and has never obtained his GED or 
HSE; however, he wants to go to school. (PSI, pp.10, 12.) Mr. Torres' goals include 
finding a job, going to school, getting his own place to live and being a better father. 
(PSI, p.12.) 
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Idaho at 673; Nice, 103 Idaho at 90. The Hoskins Court ultimately found that based 
upon the nature of the offense and the absence of any prior serious criminal record, the 
district court abused its discretion in imposing the sentence. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 675. 
Mr. Torres did have several misdemeanor convictions but had no prior felony 
convictions. (3/9/12 Tr., p.54, Ls.2-3; PSI, pp.2-6.) 
Further, Mr. Torres expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for his acts. 
(6/27/12 Tr., p.132, Ls.14-25; PSI, p.2.) Mr. Torres, in his PSI Questionnaire, wrote that 
he felt "horrible" and "stupid" for the possession of a dangerous weapon charge. (PSI, 
p.2.) He also wanted the court and his family to know that he was sorry for his actions 
and behavior, and he asked the district court for a chance to participate in programming 
so that he could stay out of prison and raise his kids. (6/27/12 Tr., p.132, Ls.15-25.) 
Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant expresses remorse 
for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 
595 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991). For example, in 
Alberts, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some leniency is required when the 
defendant has expressed "remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his 
willingness to accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character." Alberts, 
121 Idaho at 209. In Shideler, Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the prospect of 
Shideler's recovery from his poor mental and physical health, which included mood 
swings, violent outbursts, and drug abuse, coupled with his remorse for his actions, was 
so compelling that it outweighed the gravity of the crimes of armed robbery, assault with 
a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. 
Shideler, 103 Idaho at 594-95. Therefore, the court reduced Shideler's sentence from 
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an indeterminate term not to exceed twenty years to an indeterminate term not to 
exceed twelve years. Id. at 593. 
Even the presentence investigator concluded that Mr. Torres would benefit from 
an opportunity to attend classes to address his poor decision making skills and potential 
anger issues. (PSI, p.12.) The presentence investigator recommended that the district 
court retain jurisdiction over Mr. Torres. (PSI, p.12.) While on a retained jurisdiction 
program, Mr. Torres would have an opportunity to obtain either a GED or high school 
equivalency. (6/27/12 Tr., p.128, Ls.18-24.) Yet, the district court declined to retain 
jurisdiction over Mr. Torres. (6/27/12 Tr., p.146, Ls.6-7) 
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Torres asserts that the district court 
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He asserts that 
had the district court properly considered his family support, work history, and remorse, 
it would have followed the recommendations of the presentence investigator and 
retained jurisdiction over Mr. Torres so that he could complete the Idaho Department of 
Correction programming. Alternatively, the district court should have imposed a less 
severe sentence. 
15 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Torres respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for 
possession of a dangerous weapon and remand that case for a new trial. Alternatively, 
he requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it deems appropriate or remand his 
cases to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 29th Day of August, 2013. 
SALLY J. LEY ) 
Deputy State Appellate Pdblic Defender 
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